16 Apr 14

From: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), JAGC, USN, Detailed Defense Counsel
To: Superintendent, United States Naval Academy
Via: Staff Judge Advocate, United States Naval Academy

Subj: APPLICABILITY OF MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 412 TO ARTICLE 32 HEARINGS

Ref: (a) Your ltr 5800 Ser 28-028 of 31 Mar 14

Encl: (1) 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), JAGC, USN ltr of 5 Nov 13 (with 2 enclosures)[1]
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), JAGC, USN ruling of 30 May 2013 in *United States v. F.*
(3) NCIS Results of interview of MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(of 5 Nov 13
(4) MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) NCIS Statement of 21 Nov 13

1. Based upon an impermissible interpretation of Military Rule of Evidence 412 by the Navy's Trial Counsel Assistance Program, Region Legal Service Office Naval District Washington, in reference (a), you have been improperly ordered the Article 32 Investigating Officer to exclude any Military Rule of Evidence 412 matters from MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) Article 32 hearing. This order is improper in that: 1) it is an incorrect interpretation of the law; 2) it constitutes an improper bias toward the alleged victim and against the substantial pre-trial rights of MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6); and 3) the position is inconsistent with Presidential and Congressional intent in promulgating the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Military Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the defense requests that you modify your Article 32 appointing order to remove the provision impermissibly disallowing the Investigating Officer from considering excepted M.R.E. 412 evidence.

2. The Military Rules of Evidence and the Rules for Courts-Martial are promulgated by the President of the United States. Article 36, UCMJ. The purpose of the Rules for Courts-Martial is to "provide for the *just determination* of every proceeding relating to trial by court-martial," and the Rules are to be "construed to secure simplicity in procedure, *fairness in administration,* and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." R.C.M. 102 (emphasis added). Through R.C.M. 102, the President of the United States has implemented the procedures governing Article 32, UCMJ pre-trial investigations.

3. A properly conducted Article 32 hearing is a substantial pre-trial right. When the accused has been denied a substantial pre-trial right, he may appeal to the court to vindicate that right.

4. The Court of Military Appeals has held:

> ... [I]f an accused is deprived of *a substantial pretrial right* on timely objection, he is entitled to judicial enforcement of his right, without regard to whether such enforcement will benefit him at the trial. At that stage of the proceedings, he is perhaps the best judge of the benefits he can obtain from the pretrial right. Once

[1] This letter is referenced in your appointing order but was not enclosed.

> the case comes to trial on the merits ... the rights accorded to the accused in the pretrial stage merge into his rights at trial. If there is no timely objection to the pretrial proceedings or no indication that these proceedings adversely affected the accused's right at the trial, there is no good reason in law or logic to set aside his conviction. *United States v. Mickel*, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 324, 327 (C.M.A. 1958).

5. Although the Rules of Evidence generally do not apply to Article 32 hearings, the President specifically determined that M.R.E. 301, 302, 303, 305, 412, and Section V do apply. These rules include references to a "military judge," yet are explicitly applicable to Article 32 hearings under R.C.M. 405.

6. Military Rule of Evidence 301 (applicable to Article 32 hearings) requires that a military judge must advise any witness of his or her right against self incrimination if that witness is "apparently uninformed" of the privilege and "appears likely to incriminate himself." Although the rule contemplates information by a "military judge," clearly the President intended that the Investigating Officer fulfill this role during an Article 32 hearing. If the President believed that only a military judge could fulfill this role, his act in specifically applying M.R.E. 301 to Article 32 hearings would be nonsensical. Any argument that an Investigating Officer (who is not a military judge) could not fulfill this role would negate any protection provided by the rule.

7. Military Rule of Evidence 302 (applicable to Article 32 hearings) provides the accused with a privilege to prevent a statement during an R.C.M. 706 hearing from being used in evidence against him. The rule contemplates that a military judge may prohibit an accused from presenting mental health evidence if he refused to submit to an examination (M.R.E. 302(d)). And the accused may claim the privilege only after following the M.R.E. 304 procedure for determining admissibility (which provided under M.R.E. 304(d)(2) specifically involves notice and findings by a military judge). Clearly the President intended that the Investigating Officer fulfill this role during an Article 32 hearing. If the President believed that only a military judge could fulfill this role, his act in specifically applying M.R.E. 302 to Article 32 hearings would be nonsensical and would provide no protection to the accused. Any argument that an Investigating Officer (who is not a military judge) could not fulfill this role would negate any protection provided by the rule.

8. In his memorandum, Director TCAP seeks to justify the exclusion of M.R.E. 412 evidence from an Article 32 hearing based upon M.R.E. 303. M.R.E. 303 prohibits posting degrading questions to any person *before any military tribunal* if the evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade that person. Applying a strict interpretation of the term "tribunal," as government counsel has done to the term "military judge," an Article 32 hearing is not a tribunal. Applying this absurd interpretation, defense counsel would be free to ask any immaterial or degrading question of any witness, merely because a tribunal is defined as "the seat of a judge;

the place where he administers justice; the whole body of judges who compose a jurisdiction; a judicial court; the jurisdiction which the judges exercise." *United States v. Ford, 641 F. Supp. 704; (D. S.C. 1986) (citing Black's Law Dictionary* 1350 (5th ed. 1979). The case further held that a "Tribunal" "is further defined as a court or forum of justice." *Id, citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* 1259 (1984). Furthermore, a question admissible under an M.R.E. 412 exception is not a degrading question, otherwise there would *be no exceptions* to M.R.E. 412 as all such questions would be degrading and therefore inadmissible.

9. The Privileges of Section V of the Military Rules of Evidence are applicable to Article 32 hearings. Under M.R.E. 104, it is the military judge's province to determine the existence of a privilege.[2] Restated, *only a military judge* may determine if evidence is covered by a privilege. If an Investigating Officer may not, under the Superintendent and government counsel's absurd reading of the rule, perform any function allocated to a "military judge" under the Rules, then an Investigating Officer may not rule upon the applicability of *any privilege* during an Article 32 hearing. Defense counsel would therefore be allowed to inquire into any seemingly privileged matters and the Investigating Officer (lacking status as a military judge) would be powerless to stop the inquiry. Matters of spousal privilege, lawyer-client privilege—including VLC/Victim privilege, clergy privilege, psychotherapist privilege, classified information privilege, and confidential informant identities, and Victim advocate privilege could all be laid bare if an Investigating Officer could not make a determination that the matter was privileged. The President's action in specifically applying the Privilege rules to Article 32 hearings would be entirely meaningless if an Investigating Officer could not enforce those privileges. It is clear that any sensible reading of the rules indicates that an Investigating Officer can perform the function of a military judge in determining privileges. Any contrary interpretation--that an Investigating Officer can step into the shoes of a military judge in order to exclude information determined to be privileged, but may not step into the shoes of a military judge to conduct an M.R.E. 412 analysis and allow evidence covered by an exception--would clearly be an impermissible double standard applied solely to frustrate the rights of the accused.

10. M.R.E. 505 (applicable to Article 32 hearings) protects classified information from disclosure if disclosure would harm national security. The rule specifically contemplates that a military judge may "preclude disclosure of any classified information" sought by the defense. If government counsel's argument is correct, then an Investigating Officer (lacking military judge status) may not preclude defense counsel from presenting classified information in an open hearing. This is clearly not the result intended by the President.

[2] "Preliminary questions concerning the ... existence of a privilege ... shall be determined by the military judge. In making these determinations the military judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." M.R.E. 104.

11. M.R.E. 1102(d) specifically reiterates that the Military Rules of Evidence do not apply to Article 32 hearings, but reiterates that M.R.E. 412 *does apply*. The rule does not limit certain aspects of M.R.E. 412 as applying, instead applying the entire rule, including its exceptions.

12. Through the JAGMAN, the Navy Judge Advocate General has promulgated rules interpreting and supplementing the Manual for Courts-Martial. In JAGMAN §0143, the JAG specifically contemplated that Article 32 Investigating Officers have the authority to close portions of Article 32 hearings.[3] JAGMAN §0143 references R.C.M. 806(b)(2) for the authority to close a court hearing.

13. R.C.M. 806(b)(2) contemplates that a military judge may close a hearing of a court-martial if he or she makes case specific findings justifying closure. Because an Article 32 officer is empowered to close an Article 32 hearing, it is clear that R.C.M. 806(b)(2) equally applies to Investigating Officers during Article 32 hearings as it applies to military judges for courts-martial.

14. Trial Counsel from RLSO NDW and other Region Legal Service Offices regularly interpreted M.R.E. 412 to apply during Article 32 hearings, with the Article 32 Investigating Officer performing the M.R.E. 412(c) procedure to determine which evidence would be allowed under an enumerated exception. Furthermore, you have drafted Article 32 appointing orders which did not limit M.R.E. 412 excepted evidence. Your position shifted only after a three-accused joint Article 32 hearing at the Washington Navy Yard garnered national press interest.

15. Through Executive Order 13593, President Barack Obama amended the Manual for Courts-Martial on 13 December, 2011. He did not amend M.R.E. 412 to indicate that evidence covered by its exceptions would not be allowed during Article 32 hearings. Nor did he amend R.C.M. 405 to specifically disallow any M.R.E. 412 evidence.

16. Through Executive Order 13643 of May 15, 2013, President Barack Obama again amended the Manual for Courts-Martial. He did not amend M.R.E. 412 to indicate that evidence covered by its exceptions would not be allowed during Article 32 hearings. Nor did he amend R.C.M. 405 to specifically disallow any M.R.E. 412 evidence covered by an exception.

[3] Consistent with R.C.M. 405(h)(3) and appellate case law, R.C.M. 806(b)(2) applies to Article 32, UCMJ, investigations. Ordinarily, the proceedings of a pretrial investigation should be open to spectators. Only if R.C.M. 806(b)(2) is satisfied, should the convening authority or investigating officer direct that any part of an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation be held in closed session and that persons be excluded. In cases dealing with classified information, the investigating officer will ensure that any part of a pretrial investigation (e.g., rights advisement and any unclassified testimony) that does not involve classified information will remain open to spectators.

17. On 26 December 2013, President Barack Obama signed the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act into law. The Act amended Article 32, UCMJ in substantial ways. Effective for offenses allegedly committed on or after a date one year from enactment the Article 32 hearing:

a. Serves only a purpose of determining probable cause;

b. Does not include defense discovery as a purpose;

c. Recommends that an Investigating Officer outrank all counsel;

d. Requires that an Investigating Officer be a judge advocate;

e. Mandates audio recording Article 32 hearings, providing a copy to the alleged victim;

f. Allows any alleged victim to refuse to testify, among other changes.

18. The 2014 NDAA was drafted following Congressional concerns over perceived problems with the military's handling of sexual assault cases, including cases prosecuted at your behalf. The Article 32 hearing in a three co-accused, high profile Naval Academy alleged sexual assault case garnered national media attention, specifically relating to questioning allowed under M.R.E. 412 by the military judge you appointed as Investigating Officer. In spite of this Congressional concern, and in spite of numerous Congressmen and women expressing a desire to curtail defense questioning during Article 32 hearings, **Congress did not amend Article 32 to specifically disallow M.R.E. 412 evidence. But Congress did amend Article 32 in other substantial ways.** Based on its Congressional authority to regulate the Land and Naval Forces, Congress could have specifically legislated that no M.R.E. 412 evidence admissible under an exception could be presented during an Article 32 hearing. Congress made no such amendment. Rather, Congress legislated that a crime victim may refuse any questioning, but only for alleged offenses occurring after 26 December 2014. This election specifically demonstrates an intention that M.R.E. 412 be applied to Article 32 hearings unchanged.

19. If Congress, or the President, sought to apply only portions of M.R.E. 412 to Article 32 hearings, Congress or the President could have easily done so. M.R.E. 405 could have been written to clearly indicate that M.R.E. 412's exclusions (but not its exceptions) apply to Article 32 hearings. Article 32, UCMJ could specifically include a provision that *no evidence* covered by M.R.E. 412 would be allowed—regardless of exception. Neither rule evidences an intention to apply *only parts* of M.R.E. 412 to the Article 32. Naturally, the government and seeks to apply the parts that limit the defense, while omitting the part that allows the defense to elicit favorable evidence. The Appointing Authority has followed suit.

20. In setting forth the Rules for Courts-Martial, the President contemplated that the term "military judge" may encompass persons who are not judge advocates and who are not Article 26(b) certified. *See* M.R.E. 101(c), indicating that "military judge" may encompass a summary court-martial officer or special court-martial president when not otherwise limited. M.R.E. 101(c).

21. In an apparent response to public criticism over questioning during the joint Naval Academy sexual assault Article 32 hearing, TCAP has issued a policy memorandum to Navy Trial Counsel with enclosures to be provided to Fleet Staff Judge Advocates and trial counsel. In that memo, the head of Navy's TCAP indicated that his policy memo was a result of "our evolving understanding" of sexual assault litigation. He conceded that his memo contained a "new theory on the application of M.R.E. 412 procedures at Article 32 hearings."

22. In his memorandum, the director of TCAP specifically acknowledged that the trial counsel's concededly "evolving" position on M.R.E. 412 will "[o]f course" result in "additional litigation once the case has been referred to trial." However, the memorandum advocates that the government intends to argue against reopening the Article 32 hearing on the basis that defense may put M.R.E. 412 matters before the Convening Authority through our objections to the impermissible exclusion of this evidence from the hearing. "[W]e can argue that the *harm* to the accused was minimal since the CA had the benefit of written objections when making his/her disposition decision." This claim concedes: 1) that the exclusion of M.R.E. 412 evidence will cause *harm* to MIDN [5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)]; and further concedes 2) that a CA should properly have M.R.E. 412 evidence for his consideration in making a fair and fully informed disposition decision that may put MIDN [5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)] at risk of spending the rest of his life in prison. Furthermore, military judges in referred courts-martial have ordered Article 32 hearings reopened based upon the impermissible exclusion of any M.R.E. 412 evidence from the hearing. *See* Enclosure (2), Judge Lewis T. Booker's opinion in *United States v. F*. In addition, Judge Carberry, a former Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals judge, issued a similar ruling in a pending court-martial in which he sat as military judge.

23. Director, TCAP improperly believes that a written objection to the CA containing defense's understanding of the M.R.E. 412 evidence will alleviate the harm done by impermissibly excluding M.R.E. 412 evidence from the Convening Authority's consideration. Argument and evidence are not the same. Though defense may present an objection indicating that an M.R.E. 412 line of questioning would have been helpful, the defense cannot present the actual evidence without making the inquiry of the complaining witness. This is especially true given NCIS's deliberately terse, unsworn rendition of MIDN [5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)]'s version of events. When the defense's right to inquire into the evidence is impermissibly frustrated, the defense can only present the version of the evidence that has been selectively presented in the NCIS investigation, without

further detail or further explanation. An objection, no matter how strongly worded, will not provide the Convening Authority with the information needed to make an educated, fully informed disposition decision. In fairness, why would you deliberately choose to disallow Constitutionally required evidence that would more fully inform your disposition decision that might put MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) in peril of serving life in prison *without possibility of parole* on the word of a scorned ex-lover? What valid purpose is served by deliberately disallowing presentation of evidence that supports MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)'s innocence of the charged offenses?

24. Director, TCAP's memorandum seeks to impermissibly exploit a lack of specificity in rules drafting in order to unfairly exclude a class of evidence from the defense. The clear Congressional and Presidential intention is to apply M.R.E. 412 to an Article 32 hearing—in terms of its prohibition, and in terms of its exceptions and procedure for admissibility. Any government counsel would certainly argue that an Investigating Officer could enforce any of the Section V privileges, even though she is not a military judge. A contrary reading would produce absurd results.

25. The Military Rules of Evidence are set forth by the President of the United States. You do not have the authority to countermand those rules.

26. The Rules for Courts-Martial are set forth by the President of the United States. You do not have the authority to countermand those rules.

27. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is federal law. You do not have the authority to countermand the provisions of the Code.

28. Ostensibly, you appointed LCDR 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), JAGC, USN as the Investigating Officer because you believe that she is competent to complete the assigned task and because you would find her recommendations to be valuable. She is likewise competent to use her own legal training and judgment to interpret the Military Rules of Evidence and the Rules for Courts-Martial applicable to this hearing. Supplanting her legal judgment with your own is an impermissible infringement upon MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)'s substantial pre-trial rights and demonstrates a bias against MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), and in favor of MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(If you do not trust LCDR 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(to appropriately apply the exceptions to M.R.E. 412, you should not have appointed her as Investigating Officer for a case involving offenses subject to life in confinement without possibility of parole.

29. Defense counsel specifically object to any communications between the Investigating Officer and Government counsel (or other RLSO NDW representatives) or your representatives which do not include defense counsel.

30. In defending the liberty of MIDN [redacted], who faces spending the rest of his life in prison without possibility of parole for allegations of sexual assault and forcible sodomy, defense counsel do not intend to be any more "respectful of the privacy interests of the victim"[4] in our objections to this Article 32 hearing than the alleged victim has been of her own privacy interests by disclosing to NCIS the nature of her sexual relationship with MIDN [redacted].

31. MIDN [redacted] and MIDN [redacted] were engaged in an on-again, off-again romantic and sexual relationship. That relationship began after their plebe summer ended and continued at various times through the latest date of the charged offenses. That sexual relationship continued even after MIDN [redacted] alleges that she was forcibly sodomized and sexually assaulted. *See* Enclosures (3) and (4). It is impossible for you to consider the veracity of MIDN [redacted]'s allegations against her then-boyfriend, MIDN [redacted] without understanding:

a. The state of their sexual relationship at the time of the three alleged offenses;

b. The manner of initiation of sex during their ongoing sexual relationship, in order to understand whether MIDN [redacted] reasonably believed that MIDN [redacted] consented to sex on a given occasion, when mistake of fact is an affirmative defense to all charged offenses;

c. MIDN [redacted]'s motive to fabricate a false allegation of sexual assault based on her animus toward MIDN [redacted] after their sexual relationship ended;

d. MIDN [redacted]'s bias against MIDN [redacted] based on her animus toward MIDN [redacted] after their relationship ended.

32. As an example, MIDN [redacted] is alleged to have initiated unwanted anal sex with MIDN [redacted] during an otherwise consensual sexual encounter. It is impossible to investigate the alleged assault without inquiring into the surrounding circumstances. To expect otherwise is to unnaturally isolate one alleged act from the context that gave rise to a defense of consent and mistake of fact as to consent. The unwarranted and improper exclusion of any M.R.E. 412 evidence will fatally cripple your ability to fairly evaluate whether reasonable grounds exist to make MIDN [redacted] stand trial by general court-martial, risking the rest of his life in confinement, felony conviction, sex offender registration, and dismissal. MIDN [redacted] requests that he be allowed a full and fair Article 32 hearing, according to existing law and regulations, in order to defend himself against these serious allegations.

33. The Court of Military Appeals has held that "the appointed Article 32 officer must be impartial and, as a quasi-judicial officer, is held to similar standards set for a military judge" and

[4] CDR Rugh ltr of 5 November 2013, paragraph 3.

that the Article 32 hearing's function as a "discovery proceeding" which "stands as a bulwark against baseless charges." *United States v. Samuels*, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 212 (1959); *United States v. Collins*, 6 M.J. 256 (C.M.A. 1979). Your improper limitation frustrates the impartiality of the Investigating Officer by supplanting her legal interpretation with your own improper interpretation and inhibits defense discovery of exculpatory evidence. In light of recent military judges' rulings reopening Article 32 hearings to correct the very error you are committing in this case, your persistence in this course of action can only be seen as demonstrating unlawful command influence in the pre-trial process and an impermissible bias against MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) and in favor of MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(

34. The defense requests that you amend the Article 32 appointing order prior to commencement of the 28-29 April 2014 Article 32 hearing.

35. MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) explicitly waives his right to a public Article 32 hearing for the purpose of conducting an M.R.E. 412 hearing to determine admissibility of covered evidence. He does not object to your action in protecting any portion of a recording or report pertaining to M.R.E. 412 evidence.

36. MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) expressly objects to provision of this letter, or any other case-related discovery or filing except M.R.E. 412 or M.R.E. 513 motions, to MIDN 5 U.S.C. 552(b or her detailed legal counsel.

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

LCDR, JAGC, USN
Detailed Defense Counsel

Copy to:
Government Counsel

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

From: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 10:54 AM
To: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Cc:

Subject: RE: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) Article 32 Hearing Objection
Signed By: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6),

Roger all. WILCO.

BT

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

I do not intend to provide additional written response to your objection. As per this email, I will comply with the CA's direction. I will accept any additional written objections/responses and will include them in the Art 32 report.

V/r,

5 U.S.C. 55

-----Original Message-----
From: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 10:46 AM
To: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) Article 32 Hearing Objection

Ma'am,

You are correct that per the Appointing Order, the Convening Authority is directing the exclusion of any evidence offered under MRE 412, or exceptions thereunder, during the Article 32 Hearing.

V/r

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 4:37 PM
To: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Cc: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) Article 32 Hearing Objection

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) ,

In light of the defense objection, sent in the below email, I am requesting clarification from the Convening Authority regarding paragraph 3 of my appointing orders.

Paragraphs 30 and 31 of the objection, as well as enclosures 3 and 4 of it, indicate to me that the Defense intends to offer evidence under MRE 412(b)(1)(B) in order to prove consent and/or the affirmative defense of mistake of fact. Following a review of the defense objection, is the Convening Authority directing me, as the IO, to not allow the Defense to introduce any evidence, even in a closed hearing, under the exception to MRE that pertains to prior consent between the two parties? I will comply with the CA's direction but I want to ensure that I understand it and the scope of the limitation it places on the investigation.

Thank you.
V/r,
5 U.S.C. 55

-----Original Message-----
From: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2014 5:51 PM
To: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

Subject: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) Article 32 Hearing Objection

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) ,
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) objects to the impermissible exclusion of all MRE 412 covered evidence from his Article 32 hearing, as stated in the attached objection.

Thank you,

Very respectfully,

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

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5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

From: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 16, 2014 12:22 PM
To: 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: Victim's preference ICO 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
Attachments: smime.p7s; smime.p7s

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6),

My client does not wish to go to trial based on the Investigating Officer's recommendation; however, she would like the Superintendent to consider available alternative forums that could result in the removal of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) from the Naval Academy.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you!

v/r,

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

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